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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FOUR SEASONS PROPERTIES,
a Utah limited partnership,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.
Case No. 20693
THOMAS D. ELLIOT, Trustee for
FRONTIER PROPERTIES, INC.,
a California corporation, et al,
Defendants/Appellant,
REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The salient issue presented in this case is whether or
not

the trial

court's

substantial evidence.

findings

and Judgment

are supported by

Peripherally related to this issue, are

questions of whether or not the trial court correctly found that
Healy was not an agent of Four Seasons and, whether or not the
trial court utilized the appropriate measure of damage in this
case, which involved a breach of land sale contract.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case involves an appeal from a Judgment entered in
favor of plaintiff
Elliot,

Trustee

for

and against
Frontier

defendant/appellant, Thomas D.
Properties,

Inc.,

a

California

corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Trustee"). [R.1921,1833]

Plaintiff, Four Seasons Properties, is a Utah limited
partnership (hereinafter referred to as "Four Seasons11) organized
and existing under the laws of the State of Utah.

[R.1921]

On November 15, 1979, Four Seasons, by and through its
partners,

sold

to

defendant,

Frontier

Properties,

Inc.,

(hereinafter referred to as "Frontier11) certain real property in
Salt

Lake

County,

State

of

Utah,

[R.1922],

for

the

sum

of

$2,100,000.00 as per the Uniform Real Estate Contract dated the
15th day of November, 1979.

[R.1922, Exhibit IP]

Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Frontier paid to
Four Seasons during
$500,000.00

with

the

the first year certain payments
balance

of

the

contract

totalling

to be paid

in

monthly installments of $14,041.13 at 10% interest commencing on
December 1, 1979.

[R.1922-1923]

At the time of the sale of the subject property, there
was a balance due and owing, pursuant to the mortgage placed on
the

property

by

Lincoln

Savings

(hereinafter

"Lincoln'1) in the amount of $901,000.00.

referred

to as

[R.1923]

There was also a Note and a Trust Deed by Earnest H.
Coleman

and

Violet

V.

Coleman

(hereinafter

referred

to

as

"Colemans"), on the subject property in the original amount of
$50,000.00, with approximately $41,000.00 still due and owing at
the time Frontier purchased the subject property.
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[R.1923]

On or about June 8, 1979, a third Deed of Trust was
placed on the subject property in favor of the Lockhart Company
(hereinafter
$83,000.00.

referred

to

as

"Lockhart")

in

the

amount

of

[R.1923]

Subsequent to the execution of the real estate contract
on November 15, 1979, Four Seasons placed another obligation in
the amount of $390,000.00 on the subject property in favor of
Zions

First

National

Bank

referred to as "Zions").

of

Salt

Lake

City,

(hereinafter

[R.1923]

On or about August 17, 1981, Frontier filed a Chapter
11 bankruptcy proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of California, Case No. C81-1177-K, in
San Diego, California.
During

the

[R.1833, 1924]
month

of

November,

1981,

a

series

of

hearings was held in the bankruptcy court in which Four Seasons
attempted
subject

to persuade
property.

stipulation
parties.

Trustee

Following

[Trial Exhibit

that no
a

equity

series

22P] was

of

entered

existed

in the

negotiations,
into between

a
the

Under the terms of this Stipulation, Trustee was given

the right to assume or reject the real estate contract.

[R.1924]

After electing to assume said contract on January 22, 1982, the
Trustee had

until July

22, 1982, to cure all defaults.

Stipulation also provided

that if Trustee
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failed

The

to cure all

defaults the automatic stay of the bankruptcy court as to said
contract would then be lifted.

[R.1924]

Between January 22, 1982, and July 22, 1982, Trustee
attempted to sell the subject property. [F.1925]

Thereafter,

Four Seasons tried diligently to market the subject property.
Four Seasons kept in contact with Trustee because the Uniform
Real Estate Contract had been recorded, and hence was a cloud on
the title and an encumberance on the subject property.

[R.1925]

These endeavors to sell the subject property failed for
various reasons, some due to Trustee's action, Lincoln's demand
that the rate of interest be increased because of a provision of
their note and mortgage, Trustee's demand to make a profit on the
transaction, and Trustee's failure to communicate offers to Four
Seasons.

[R.1833, 1925]
On October 1, 1982, both Lincoln and Colemans obtained

a relief from the stay order of the United States Bankruptcy
Court of the Southern District of California. [R.1925]
Lincoln immediately commenced foreclosure proceedings
and the subject property was set for mortgage foreclosure sale on
May 24, 1983.

[R.1925]

On October 8, 1982, the Colemans filed a notice of
default

on their Trust Note and

the Trustee's

sale on the

Colemans Trust Deed was set for February 22, 1983. [R.1834, 1926]
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Thereafter,
assigned

on

January

12, 1983, the

their note to Fred Healy

"Healy") for the unpaid balance.

Colemans

duly

(hereinafter referred to as

[R.1834, 1926]

Healy, on February 22, 1983, personally purchased and
acquired the subject property at the sherifffs sale pursuant to
Trial Exhibits 32P and 33P by bidding the amount of his own debt.
[R.1834, 1926]

Prior to the sale, Trustee had been given proper

notice and was aware of the time and date set for such sale.
[R.1926]

At

the

time of

the

sale, the

subject

property was

encumbered in the amount of $1,504,817.88. [R.1834, 1928]

After

purchasing the subject property, Healy, who was a partner with
John Prince, a
unsuccessful

local businessman

in his

efforts

in the Salt Lake area, was

to market

the

subject

property.

[R.1926]
Healy, in addition to his general work of buying and
selling real estate, was also an appraiser.

He had dealt in the

real estate market, and with properties of similar nature as the
subject property, in the Salt Lake area for a long time.

There-

fore, Healy was well qualified to give an opinion concerning the
value

of

the

subject

property.

In his

opinion, the

subject

property had a fair market value of $1,550,000.00 as of February
22, 1983.

This opinion was based upon Healyfs expertise in the

real estate market, high
estate market, and his

interest rates, changes
thorough

aspects of the subject property.
-5-

familiarity
[R.1927]

with

in the real
all

of

the

Jesse F. Cannon, as a general partner of Four Seasons
had also been buying and purchasing real estate in the Salt Lake
market for a long time and was well acquainted with properties
with similar characteristics as the subject property.

Mr. Cannon

testified that in his opinion, the subject property, on February
22, 1983, had a fair market value of $1,550,000.00.

[R.1927]

Based on the uncontradicted opinions of Healy and Mr.
Cannon, the

court

found

that

the fair market value of the

property as of February 22, 1983, was $1,550,000.00.

[R.1927]

Prior to February 22, 1983, Zion and Lockhart informed
Healy that the sheriff's sale set for February 22, 1983, of the
Colemans Trust Deed would impair their security and they would
not allow him to be the successful bidder at the sale in order to
protect their Trust Deeds.

Therefore, Healy signed subordination

agreements with Lockhart and Zion as to the Colemans Trust Deed
Note and Mortgage.

[F.1927]

Prior to the date of the foreclosure of the Lincoln
mortgage, on May 24, 1982, Zion and Lockhart notified Jesse F.
Cannon and Thomas Q. Cannon that they were not going to redeem
Lincoln1s mortgage.

Instead they would hold the Cannons to their

obligation

under

the Cannons

personal

signatures

as general

partners.

Thereafter, on May 24, 1983, Jesse F. Cannon and

Thomas Q. Cannon personally purchased the subject property from
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Healy for approximately $41,000.00 subject to the existing Notes,
Trust

Deeds

and

encumberances

on

the

subject

property.

[R.1927-1928]
Healy

acquired

the

property

in

an

arms-length

transaction at a foreclosure sale which was duly advertised and
notice was given generally in a manner provided for Trustee's
sales.

Furthermore, notice was given to the Trustee personally,

who duly acknowledged that in open court. [R.1834,1928]

Hence,

Trustee had adequate opportunity, if he so desired, to arrange
for other purchasers or to bid on the subject property himself.
[R.1928]
The further sale of the subject property by Healy to
the Cannons was
paid

good

another

and valuable

arms-length

transaction.

consideration

to Healy

acquired the subject property. [R.1928]

The Cannons

and

personally

This personal acquisi-

tion of the subject property, however, does not affect the right
and the cause of action for damages that Four Seasons has against
Frontier.

[R.1928]
The

Trustee's

rejection

of

the

Uniform

Real

Estate

Contract, after assuming the same, constituted a breach which was
recognized by the United States Bankruptcy Court.

Said court, in

an order entered June 30, 1983, specifically held as follows:
"2.
. . . Accordingly, the damages suffered by
Four Seasons Properties, if any, arising out of
the breach of the land sale contract, constitutes
an administrative priority claim against the State
of Frontier Properties, Inc." [R.1929,Exhibit 36P]
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On

the

date

of

the

sheriff's

sale,

the

parties

stipulated that the balance due and owing by Frontier to Four
Seasons under
November

the Uniform Real Estate Contract, executed on

15, 1979, was

$1,749,950.32.

The

parties

further

stipulated that the indebtedness on the outstanding mortgages and
Trust Deeds was $1,504,817.88.

[R.1929]

An order issued by the United States Bankruptcy Court
for

the

Southern

District

of California

on June

16, 1983,

pursuant to Trial Exhibit 36P, provided as follows:
"1. The Trustee's motion to reject the executory
land sale contract entered into between the
debtor, Frontier Properties, Inc., and Four
Seasons Properties, which had been assumed on
January 22, 1982, by election of the Trustee in
accordance with the terms of a stipulation between
the parties is hereby denied insofar as the
Trustee attends, through his motion, to have his
rejection and the consequences of the land sale
contract take effect as cf the date the order for
relief in these bankruptcy cases were entered.
f!

2. The Trustee's motion to reject the previously
assumed land sale contract constitutes a rejection
governed by 11 U.S.C. §365(g)(2) and (A) and,
therefore, constitutes a breach as of the date of
the rejection, not as of the date the orders for
relief in these bankruptcy cases were entered.
. . ." [R.1930]
On August 6, 1983, Four Seasons, pursuant to paragraph
16(c) of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, made an election to
treat said contract as a note and mortgage as set forth in said
paragraph.

But the subject property was sold under the terms and

conditions as provided for in the Colemans Trust Note and Deed on
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February 22, 1983, before Four Seasons could complete the foreclosure action under the contract, [R.1930]

Said sale of the

subject property, pursuant to the Colemans Trust Deed and Note,
was a direct and proximate result of Trustee's failure to make
the payments and cure the default under the Uniform Real Estate
Contract within six months after assuming said contract. [R.1931]
Based upon Trustee's breach, the trial court found that
as a result of such breach, Four Seasons lost the benefit of the
bargain of the contract and sustained damages in the amount of
$245,132.45. [R.1836,1931]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiff contends that the trial court's findings and
judgment were supported by substantial evidence, and therefore,
must not be disturbed on this appeal.

Plaintiff further contends

that the trial court was correct in finding that Healy was not an
agent

of

plaintiff.

The

trial

court

was

also

correct

in

recognizing the benefit of the bargain damages are to be awarded
for the breach of a contract
Finally, plaintiff contends

for the

sale of real property.

that in his brief appellant makes

certain arguments which are nothing more than near conclusions
and which are not supported by any evidence in the record.
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ARCUMENT
POINT I
IN REVIEWING FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT, THE SUPREME COURT MUST VIEW ALL EVIDENCE W
LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE PREVAILING PARTY AND
THE JUDGMENT MUST BE AFFIRMED WHfiRE THE FINDINGS
ARE SUBSTANTIATED BY THE EVIDENCE.
It has long been recognized by this court that a trial
court's findings and conclusions will not be disturbed on appeal
if

supported

by

substantial

evidence.

Sine

v.

Salt

Lake

Transportation Company, 106 Utah 289, 147 P.2d 875-879 (1944).
In a more recent case, Sharpe v. American Medical Systems, Inc.,
671 P.2d 185 (1983), this court stated the standard of review to
be utilized in reviewing appeals of the kind presented by the
instant case, as follows:
n

In reviewing the Findings and Judgment of the
trial court, after trial on the merits, this court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party, and the judgment will be
affirmed where the Findings of Fact are substantiated by the evidence." Id., at 187.
See also Sohm v. Winegar, 565 P.2d 1134 (1977) where
this court viewed the Findings and Judgment in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party.

First Western Fidelity v.

Gibbons and Reed Company, 27 Utah 2d 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971)
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wherein this court held that it must survey the evidence in light
most favorable to the trial court's findings.
Applying the usual standard for review to the instant
case, it is herewith

submitted

that when

surveying

the trial

court's findings, and judgment in the light most favorable to
Four Seasons, it is clear that said findings and judgment were
supported by substantial evidence, and, therefore, must not be
disturbed.
POINT II
AGENCY IS ORDINARILY A RELATION CREATED BY
AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES. BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO
THE RELATION, THERE MUST BE A MEETING OF THE MINDS
IN ESTABLISHING THE1 AGENCY , THE CONSENT OF BOTH
PR INCIPAL AND AGENT IS NECESSARY TO CREATE AGENCY.
One of the very basic requirements to the formation of
an agency relationship is an agreement between the principal and
the agent.

There must be a meeting of the minds in establishing

agency, and consent of both principal and agent is necessary.
3 Am.Jur.2d,

Agency,

§17.

The

Restatement

of

The

Law,

2d,

Agency, §15 provides as follows:
"Agency relation exists only if there has been a
manifestation by the principal to the agent that
the agent may act on his account, and consent by
the agent to so act.11
Applying these generally recognized rules of law to the
present case, it becomes apparent that the trial court correctly
found that

l!

on February 22, 1983, Healy personally purchased and

acquired the subject property." [R.1926]
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The evidence presented

in this case supports such finding.

In fact, the record in this

case contains no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, which
supports the Trustee's feable assertion that Healy was acting as
an agent of Four Seasons.

[Appellant's brief, page 14.]

Four Seasons is fully aware that an agency may be
created by estoppel, necessity or operation of law.
Agency, §19.

Four Seasons is also aware that some courts have

recognized the concept of implied agency.
617

P.2d

3 Am.Jur.2d,

358,

360

(1980).

True

Forseyth v. Pendelton,

v.

High-Plains

Machinery, Inc., 577 P.2d 991 (Wyoming, 1978).

Elevator

In True, supra,

plaintiff brought an action against a materialman to recover
damages.

The court in that case did recognize the existence of

implied agency, but the court held that

ff

there can be no agency

relationship unless the factual element of control is present".
Id. at 999.

In other words, it is essential that the principal

is in control.

The Restatement of the Law 2d, Agency, §1 defines

the essential elements of an agency relationship as follows:
"Agency is the fiduciary relationship which
results from the manifestation of consent by one
person to another that the other shall act on his
behalf subject to his control, and consent by the
other to so act.11 True, supra, at 999. 3 Am.Jur.
2d, Agency, §2.
When this fundamental idea of agency is applied to the
present case, the fallacy of Trustee's argument becomes very
clear.

In his brief, (Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-14) Trustee

makes certain assertions by which he attempts to demonstrate how
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Healy acted as agent of Four Seasons.
despite

These assertions are made

the absence of any evidence that Four Seasons in any

manner controlled Healy1s actions.

Healy personally acquired the

subject property at the sheriff's sale, [R.1926] and there is no
evidence

which

even

remotely

suggests

that

Four

Seasons

instructed, or otherwise directed, Healy to purchase the subject
property.
Though

Healy

nonetheless were

acting

interested

subject property.
were personally

was

independently,

in all transactions

the

Cannons

involving

the

The reason for this interest was that they

liable for the Zion and Lockhart obligations.

[T.57 & 109, R.1927-1928]
A further examination of the testimony presented at the
trial

will

ludicrous.

demonstrate

that

appellant's

agency

argument

is

Mr. Jesse F. Cannon testified that no arrangements

were made to have Healy act as the agent of Four Seasons. [T.61]
Healy also testified that at no time did he have any arrangement
or

agreement

[T.121]

with

Cannon

Furthermore,

to

purchase

the

trial

consideration of all of the testimony

the

subject

court,

property.

after

careful

and evidence, concluded

that Healy personally purchased the subject property. [R.1926]
Some

of

the

salient

testimony

was

that

the

court

considered Mr. Healy was an associated professor in finance at
the University of Utah, [T.117] and had done numerous appraisals
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for

Consolidated

Capital,

institutions. [T.117]
and

owner

in

Utah

Power

&

Light

and

other

That he originally represented the Seller

selling

the property

to

the

respondent, Four

Seasons, [T.119] and that he felt that he could negotiate a new
loan through Lincoln, [T.120] and was buying the property with
genuine,

serious

intentions.

[T.121]

His

testimony

of his

genuine intention is set forth as follows: [T.121]
Q.

When you were buying the property, what were your
intentions?

A.

Our intention -- my intention with my partner,
John Prince, was to purchase the property or to
dispose of it to other interested parties.

I was

presently doing that.
Q.

Is that John Prince of Prince, the stockbrokers?

A.

He is a stockbroker."

The record then indicates that he contacted Jim Gaddis
of Gaddis Investments, Mansell and Associates, Mark Milburn with
Coordinated Financial Services. [T.123]
became very

apparent

estate investor

From the testimony it

that this associate professor

and real

[T.116] independently of Mr. Cannon and Four

Seasons Properties, had a tremendous knowledge of the property,
and improvements and was genuinely trying to market the subject
property

for

a profit

and

appellant

evidence to the contrary.
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failed

to produce

any

It

is hereby

submitted

that

no

existed between Four Seasons and Healy.

agency

relationship

It is further submitted

that there is no evidence that Four Seasons and Healy entered
into an agency relationship, either express or implied.

Nor is

there any evidence that Four Seasons did or could have exercised
any control over Healy in his personal acquisition of the subject
property.

Therefore, the trial court's findings, that Healy was

not acting as Four Seasons1 agent, must be affirmed.
POINT III
THE BENEFIT OF THE BARGAIN DAMAGES THE PROPER
AWARD FOR A BREACH OF CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF
REAL PROPERTY":
This court has long recognized the rule that benefit of
the bargain

damages

are

to be

awarded

contract for the sale of real property.
771 (1977).
an

action

for

the

breach

of a

Smith v. Warr, 564 P.2d

In Smith, the buyer of certain real property brought
for

breach

of

contract.

The

Supreme

Court,

in

reversing the trial court, ruled as follows:
"The rule followed by Utah is that benefit of the
bargain damages are to be awarded for breach of
the contract for the sale of real estate,
regardless of the good faith of the party in
breach." Id. at 772.
In a more recent case, Bitzes v. Sunset Oaks, Inc., 649
P. 2d 66, (1982) this court again reaffirmed the benefit of the
bargain rule as the appropriate measure of damages in case of the
breach of contract for the sale of real property.
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The benefit of

the bargain, is "the difference between the market price and
contract price at the time of the breach,"

IdL at 71.

See also

Terry v. Panek, 631 P.2d 896-897 (1981); Bradshaw v. Kersham, 627
P.2d 528, 532 (1981) and Gardner v. Christensen, 622 P.2d 782-783
(1980),
When the benefit of the bargain rule, as adopted by the
Supreme Court of Utah, is applied to the present case, it is
apparent that the trial court judgment must be upheld.
The soundness of the trial court's judgment is much
more apparent when considered in the following context:
1.

On January 22, 1982, Trustee assumed the Uniform

Real Estate Contract, dated November
Seasons and Frontier.

15, 1979, between Four

By so assuming said contract, Trustee

stepped into the position of Frontier. [R.1924 Exhibit 4P]
2.

On June 20, 1983, the Bankruptcy Court entered an

order denying Trustee's motion to reject the land sale contract.
That court stated:
"The Trustee's motion to reject the previously
assumed
land
sales
contract
constitutes a
rejection governed by 11 U.S.C. §365(g)(2)(A) and,
therefore, constitutes breach as of the date of
rejection, not as of the date the Orders for
relief in these bankruptcy cases was entered.
Accordingly, the damages suffered by Four Seasons
Properties, if any, arising out of the breach of
the
land
sales
contract
constitutes
an
administrative priority claim against the estate
of Frontier Properties.11 [T.65, Exhibit 35]

-16-

3.

In

addition

there

was

a

Second

Trust

Deed

on

January 22, 1982, the date of assumption by Trustee, Lincoln had
a first mortgage of $901,000 [T.90] with interest at 9% [Exhibit
18] with a due-upon-sale clause, [T.34]
any

assumption

without

an

of

its

increase

first

in

the

Lincoln would not accept

mortgage
interest

as

rate

an

underlying

lien

to 15%. [T.34]

In

addition, there was a second Trust Deed and Note of $83,000 to
Lockhart
[T.81]

[T.81]

and

The Trustee

a Trust

Deed

through

commenced, on January

Zions

of $390,000.

22, 1982, and made

numerous attempts to market the subject property. [Exhibit 7 21]
The record indicates the following attempts were made to market
the

subject

property

by

the

Trustee,

and

also

with

the

coordinated effort of Four Seasons as follows:
DATE

NAME OF PERSPECTIVE
PURCHASER

AMOUNT

SALIENT TERM

1/22/82
Exhibit 7

Cunningham Utah Fund X
Offer to Purchase
from Philip Fass
Cunningham Utah X

$1,845,000

Subject to Buyer
being able to
assume underlying
financing on terms
satisfactory to
Buyer.

1/21/82
Exhibit 8

Fritz Hoelscher

2,000,000

subject to existing
debt. Requirement of
subordinate financing
and a 5% to 9% equity
note on balance due.

9/22/82
Exhibit 13

Philip Fass

1,500,000

sale subject to not
violating the
underlying financing
signed by Fass, and
Elliot, Trustee
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10/21/82
Exhibit 14

Philip Fass
(Second offer)

1,605,000

subject to not
violating the underlying financing
signed by Fassler,
purchaser and Scott,
Trustee

10/11/82
Exhibit 15

C. Reed Petersen
Michael Madsen &
Keith Christensen

1,775,000

signed by Petersen
and Elliot, Trustee
Subject to 10%

DATE

NAME OF PERSPECTIVE
PURCHASER

AMOUNT

SALIENT TERM

11/ /82
Exhibit 16

C. Reed Petersen
Michael Madsen &
Keith Christensen
Counter offer by
Elliot, Trustee

1,710,000

assumption of
liabilities by
Buyer and Trust
a net of $100,000

12/7/82
Exhibit 17

Prince & Company

1,660,000

underlying
lienholders to discount liens and Buye
to obtain approval
of underlying
financing, signed
by Elliot, Trustee

12/2/82
Exhibit 18

TransAmerica
Properties

1,560,000

signed by Thomas
Elliot, subject
subject to the
purchaser obtaining
an agreement of the
underlying lien
to discount the
balances and the
underlying lien
holders accepting
the terms and conditions of the transaction (that
Lincoln also will
also agree to an
11% simple
interest rate.
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12/2/82
Exhibit 18

Elliotfs counter
1,660,000
offer to
TransAmerica Properties

Based upon assumption
of the underlying
first and second
mortgages with a
balance note of 11%

12/17/82
Exhibit 19

TransAmerica Properties 1,750,000

required approval of
the underlying lien
holders

1/7/83
Exhibit 21

TransAmerica
Properties

Subject to purchaser
consummating a
loan, signed by
Four Seasons
Properties, J. F.
Cannon

1,790,000

The above sales all failed for one reason or another,
mainly

because Lincoln would not accept an assumption

of the

underlying 9% mortgage without increasing the rate to 15%. [T.34]
The importance of this is well demonstrated by Healy, [T.117] and
the

rule

of

thumb

that

a change

in

interest

rate

of

1% is

translated from $80,000 to $100,000 in the reduction of the value
of

$1,000,000.

[T.125]

A

difference

of

10% to 16%, which a

purchaser would have to pay for their financing would reduce the
purchase price of land and improvements 36% to 40% less. [T.126]
4.

In

addition, Mr.

doing all that they

Cannon

could to help

and

Four

the Trustee's

Seasons

were

sale of the

property and were forwarding offers to Trustee. [T.158]
5.

After

Healy

acquired

the

property

at

a

duly

noticed sheriff's sale, he attempted to market the property to
John Prince, the Stockbroker, [T.121] Gaddis Investment, Mansell
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& Associates, Mark Milburn.

[T.123]

All of his attempts to

market the property were unsuccessful.
6.
$1,500,000.00

The

offers

received

by

Trustee

ranged

from

[open Exhibit No. 13-P] to $1,790,000.00. [Open

Exhibit No. 21-P]
7.

Based upon the uncontradicted opinions of Healy

and J. F. Cannon, the trial court found the fair market value of
the property as of February 22, 1983, was $1,550,000.00. [T.125
R. 1927]
8.

Hence,

the

value

of

the

subject

property

on

February 22, 1983, was less than the actual price that Four
Seasons had sold the property to Frontier in November, 1979.
This drop in the value of the subject property was due, in part,
to a drastic increase in the interest rate between 1979 and 1982.
Such increase results in corresponding reduction in the valuation
of real property.
9.

[T.126]

Confronted with the fact that no profit could be

made through the sale of the subject property, in the face of a
loss by his actions by assuming the land contract and in stalling
and playing the market with the property, Trustee was faced with
a loss.

Trustee tried then to reject the Uniform Real Estate

Contract, which he had previously assumed, by filing a motion in
the Bankruptcy Court. [R.1929 Exhibit 36]

There is no more

appropos statement concerning the Trustee's action in this case
than the one made by Judge Herbert Katz of the United States
-20-

Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California, in his
memorandum decision denying the Trustee's motion to reject the
executory

contract.

It as

in

said

decision

that

Judge

Ktaz

stated as follows:
f,

The trustee now argues that since he did not
comply with §365(b)(1) as of the assumption date,
January 22, 1982, he did not assume the contract.
f!

I cannot agree.

. ..

fl

The long and short of it is that the trustee was
offered an opportunity to a period of six months
to try to market the property and cure the
defaults, not at the time of acceptance, but from
the proceeds of any sale. The trustee could not
market the property. He gambled, and lost."
On February 27, 1983, the parties stipulated that the
balance

due and owing by Frontier

to Four

Seasons under

uniform Real Estate Contract, was $1,749,950.32. [T.1929]

the
The

trial court found that on that date the subject property was
encumbered in the amount of $1,504,817.88. [T.1929]
court

concluded

difference

that

between

[T.1929 & 1931]

Four
the

Seasons1

stated

loss

of

amounts,

The trial

bargain

i.e.,

was

the

$245,132.45.

This conclusion was based upon the manner in

which Trustee had discharged his official duty, and upon the fact
that Trustee was well aware of the time and place set for the
sheriff's

sale,

Lincoln's

increased

because

of

a

Trustee's

desire

to

make

demand

provision
a

that
in

profit

the
its

on

interest
note

the

be

and mortgage,

transaction

Trustee's failure to communicate offers to Four Seasons.
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rate

and

Four Seasons recognizes that the amounts relied upon by
the trial court to arrive at the actual loss of bargain damages
are not

those

amounts

above-cited cases.
judgment

entered

which

this

court

has

utilized

in the

Nonetheless, it is hereby submitted that the
by

the

trial

court

accurately

reflects

the

actual damages Four Seasons sustained as a result of Trustee's
breach of contract.

Therefore, the trial court's judgment should

be affirmed.
Trustee, in his brief, mistakenly
this action within

attempts

to bring

the purview of Utah Code Annotated, 1953,

§57-1-32. [Appellant's Brief pp. 19-20]

That section, however,

provides a means to recover the balance due, following a sale of
trust property, on an obligation for which a trust deed was given
for security.

The fallacy in this attempt by Trustee is that it

ignores the fact that this is an action for breach of contract.
Trustee had assumed the Uniform Real Estate Contract entered into
by Four Seasons and Frontier. [R.1924]

Trustee failed to cure

all defaults within the time alloted by the bankruptcy court and
later

rejected

said

contract.

breach of contract. [R.1930]

This

rejection

constituted

a

But, since the property was sold to

a third party, Four Seasons could not foreclose upon the subject
property.

Hence, the only remedy available to Four Seasons was

an action for money damages. [R.1931]
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POINT IV
IN HIS BRIEF APPELLANT MAKES CERTAIN ARGUMENTS
WHICH
ARE
MERE
CONCLUSIONS
AND
WHICH
ARE
UNSuEEOfeTEb BY ANY EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD
As stated above, this court has refused to disturb a
trial

court

findings

substantial evidence.

and

judgment

if

Sine, supra.

such

are

supported

by

Despite this general rule,

Trustee in his brief proposes several arguments that are nothing
more than unsupported conclusions.
Appellant
controlled

and

detriment

of

first belabors

manipulated
defendant.

the

[Appellant's brief, pp.14-23]
the

fact

that Four

foreclosure

[Appellant's

process

Brief

p.14]

Seasons
to

the

Trustee

testified, during the trial, that he knew of the sheriff!s sale.
Trustee even "discussed the situation with (his) legal counsel."
[R.160]

There was no evidence presented by Trustee which would

support his assertion that the foreclosure sale was controlled or
manipulated

by

Four

Seasons.

If

Trustee

was

even

slightly

concerned, he should have appeared at the time and place of the
sale or should have arranged for someone to appear on his behalf.
Trustee

asserts

that

"upon

obtaining

the

apartments

from Healy, Cannons held as Trustee for plaintiff." [Appellant's
brief p.17]

This assertion is again contrary to the findings of

the trial court and unsupported by any evidence in the record.
Trustee

states

that

because

the

Cannons

were

the

general partners of Four Seasons, they had a fiduciary obligation
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to give the partnership an opportunity to acquire the subject
property.
The

general

rule, however,

is

"that

one

must

be

personally adversely affected before he has standing to prosecute
an action."

Jenkins v. State, 585 P.2d 442-443 (1978).

Shurtleff v. J. Tuft & Company, 622 P.2d

See also

1168, 1172 (1980),

wherein this court stated that a defendant has the right to have
a cause of action prosecuted by the real party in interest to
avoid further action on the same demand by another and to permit
the defendant to assert the defenses and counterclaims available
against a real owner of the cause.
Applying this general rule to the instant case, it
becomes obvious that Trustee is stretching to reach legal ground
upon which to stand.

However, the law, with few exceptions,

allows only a real party in interest to prosecute his claim.

In

this case, Trustee lacks all standing to object to the Cannons
acquisition of the subject property.

If a claim does exist, it

belongs to the limited partners, and Trustee should not be able,
through

the utilization

of

convoluted

logic, to

change the

general rule of law.
Finally, Trustee suggests that the trial court erred
because it accepted Four Seasons credible evidence as to the fair
market value of the subject property.
Trustee

points

to

the

deposition
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To support this position,
of

Mr.

J.

F.

Cannon

to

demonstrate an inconsistency
trial.

in Mr. Cannon's

testimony at the

Four Seasons does not dispute the fact that Mr. Cannon's

opinion

as

to the

fair market value of the

subject property

varied from the date of his deposition, September 27, 1984, to
the time of trial.
relied

upon

an

At the time of the deposition, Mr. Cannon

appraisal

which

took

into

existing

12% interest rate. [T.111-112]

opinion,

which

he

rendered

at

the

account

the

then

However, Mr. Cannon's

trial,

that

the

subject

property had a fair market value of $1,500,000.00 was based, in
part, upon the fact that the interest rate had increased to 16%.
[T.114]

This significant increase in interest rates translates

into $400,000.00 less than what the appraisal indicated. [T.112]
Rule 32 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides,
among

other

purpose

of

things, that
contradicting

deponent as a witness.

the deposition may

be used

for the

and

testimony

of the

impeaching

the

But the deposition is not evidence.

Mr.

Cannon testified at the trial that in his opinion the subject
property had the value of $1,500,000.00. [R.1927]

This testimony

was

as

supported

by

other

credible

evidence, and

such

fully

supports the trial court's finding that the subject property had
a

fair

market

value

of

$1,500,000.00

[R.1927]
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on

February

22, 1983.

CONCLUSION
The trial court in this case has correctly held that
Healy was not an agent of Four Seasons and that the benefits of
the bargain is the proper measure of damages in a case involving
a breach of a land sales contract.

This holding is consistent

with the long established and uniformly accepted rules of law.
Furthermore, this holding is substantiated by the evidence in the
record.

Despite such evidence, and the rules of law, Trustee

attempts to suggest that Healy was an agent of Four Seasons.
only

Not

is this attempt unsupported by the evidence, it is also

addressing

a mute

issue.

In light of

the bankruptcy

court's

order, which is quoted above, Trustee breached the Uniform Real
Estate Contract.

Hence, the only relevant issue was whether or

not Four Seasons suffered any damages resulting from Trustee's
breach.

The trial court concluded that Four Seasons had suffered

damages and entered an appropriate judgment.

Four Seasons has

shown that the findings and judgment of the trial court were
predicated

upon

proper

assumption

of

the

facts

which

are

supported by substantial evidence in the record.

Four Seasons

has

unsupported,

also

pointed

out

the

mere,

and

totally

conclusions set forth in appellant's brief through which he urges
this court to reverse the trial court's judgment.

Thus, Trustee

has failed to comply with the rigid standards of review set up by
this court, and has failed to establish in this case the very
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basic elements necessary

for the reversal of the findings and

judgment of the trial court.
seeks

by

this

To grant the Trustee the relief he

appeal, under

the

circumstances

shown

by

the

evidence in the record, would in effect overrule the cases and
law cited herein.

The trial court's findings and judgment in

this case should be affirmed, and Four Seasons should be awarded
its costs incurred in this appeal.
Dated this / ^

day of September, 1985.
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